Ed. Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray
“Military culture, Military efficiency, and the Red Army, 1917-1945,” in
The Culture of Military Organizations
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 978-1108724487
Publication date: 2019
Culture has an enormous influence on military organizations and their success or failure in war. Cultural biases often result in unstated assumptions that have a deep impact on the making of strategy, operational planning, doctrinal creation, and the organization and training of armed forces. Except in unique circumstances culture grows slowly, embedding so deeply that members often act unconsciously according to its dictates. Of all the factors that are involved in military effectiveness, culture is perhaps the most important. Yet, it also remains the most difficult to describe and understand, because it entails so many external factors that impinge, warp, and distort its formation and continuities. The sixteen case studies in this volume examine the culture of armies, navies, and air forces from the Civil War to the Iraq War and how and why culture affected their performance in the ultimate arbitration of war.
Contents: Culture and military organizations / Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras — Strategic culture / David Kilcullen — Ulysses S. Grant and the culture of the Union Army of the Tennessee / Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh — “Playing a very bold game”: The organizational culture of the Army of Northern Virginia, 1862-1865 / Mark Grimsley — German Army culture, 1871 to 1945 / Jorit Wintjes — The culture of the Indian Army 1900-1947: An evolving identity / Daniel Marston — An Army apart: The influence of culture on the Victorian British Army / Richard Hart Sinnreich — The culture of the British Army, 1914-1945 / Williamson Murray — Imperial Japanese Army culture, 1918-1945: Duty heavier than a mountain, death lighter than a feather / David Hunter-Chester — Military culture, Military efficiency, and the Red Army, 1917-1945 / Reina Pennington –An Army Like no other: The origins of the IDF’s military culture / Gil-li Vardi — The weight of the shadow of the past: The organizational culture of the Iraqi Army, 1921-2003 / Kevin M. Woods — U.S. Army culture, 1973-2017 / Peter R. Mansoor — The Royal Navy, 1900-1945: Learning from disappointment / Corbin Williamson — US Navy cultural transformations, 1945-2017: The jury is still out / John T. Kuehn — The United States Marine Corps, 1973-2017: Cultural preservation in every place and clime / Allan R. Millett — The culture of the Royal Air Force, 1918-1945 / David Stubbs — United States Air Force culture, 1947-2017 / Robert Farley — Conclusion / Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray.
From Reina Pennington’s essay on “Military culture, Military efficiency,
and the Red Army, 1917-1945″
“The Red Army’s military culture from 1917 to 1945 shows selective continuity
with centuries of Russian military tradition, as well as dramatic innovation and
discontinuity. The Bolshevik Party set out to create a new kind of state, a new
kind of army, even a new kind of human being, the New Soviet Man. It never
achieved the total transformation it envisioned, but the attempt shaped a unique military culture that blended new ideals with old traditions.
“For all the discontinuities in the Red Army, one cannot consider the military
culture of the Soviet era sui generis; continuities with the old imperial army
were also in evidence.1 Despite the dramatic transformations of the Soviet era,
there were“persistent factors” in the culture of the Red Army.2 Continuity was
evident in many areas: the officer corps, conscription, a hierarchical rank
structure, and military discipline. However, it was not the intention of the
new Soviet state to allow such continuity; in fact, the state had intended just
the opposite.”
“
“This ambitious work seeks to prove that culture is the key element in
the success or failure of a military organization, while also providing a roadmap for
helping military leaders understand the genesis of culture, how that culture influences
the functionality of the organization and, ultimately, how that culture changes.
The Culture of Military Organizations is an ambitious undertaking, and it makes
a valuable contribution to the studies of organizational culture and military history . . . Military leaders would be well served by digesting these key lessons and applying them to their organizations in the fights of tomorrow.”
Dalton Johnson, The Journal of Military History
“
“In Reina Pennington’s chapter, we find that the Soviet Union’s army purged many of its experienced commanders to secure Stalin’s regime in 1937. This was an irrational strategic liability considering the rise of Nazi Germany with its anti-communist and expansionist foreign policy. It shows though that the Red Army had a low orientation to its own future survival. Pennington likens the Red Army as a child of Stalin’s regime – at times loved, but also often beaten and hated.”